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CHAPTER 3 
Civil Practice and Procedire 
ERIC WODLINGER & MITCHELL H. KAPLAN" 
§3.1. Long Arm Jurisdiction. In the Survey year the Supreme Judi-
cial Court has again construed the reach of the Massachusetts Long 
Arm Statute. 1 In Drottkas v. Devers Training Ac{/(leml, Inc., 2 the plain-
tiff filed suit in the commonwealth against the def ndant, a Florida 
corporation, alleging personal jurisdiction on the gro nds that the de-
fendant had transacted business in the commonwealt 3 and contracted 
to supply merchandise in the commonwealth.4 1 
The plaintiff, Droukas, had read the defendant's advertisement for 
the sale of marine engines in a magazine distributed in Massachusetts. 
He then telephoned the defendant in Florida, ordered two engines, and 
subsequently mailed the defendant a check for the purchase price:'i The 
defendant, in turn, wrote to the plaintiff" confirming the sale and later 
sent further correspondence concerning the engines o the plaintiff in 
Massachusetts.0 The engines were finally shipped t the plaintiff ac-
companied by a bill of lading which bore the legend _"charges to be 
collect." In the complaint, the plaintiff alleged that upon receipt he 
found the engines to be defective.' 
The Court noted that it had already construed the Massachusetts 
Long Arm Statute to provide jurisdiction over the person to the limits 
allowed by the Constih1tion of the United States.8 To be within these 
" ERIC WODLINGER and MITCHELL H. KAPLAN practice law with the finn 
of Choate, Hall & Stewart, Boston. 
§3.1. 1 G.L. c. 223A. 
2 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1175, 376 N.E.2d 548. 
a G.L. c. 223A, § 3(a). 
4 Id. § 3(b). 
5 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1177, 376 N.E.2d at 549-50. 
6 Id., 376 N.E.2d at 550. 
7 Id. n.2. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant had represented the en-
gines to be in perfect condition, but that they had been damaged hy salt water 
prior to shipping. The defendant, on the other hand, claimed that plaintiff's agent 
had inspected the engines and purchased them in "as is" condition. Id. 
8 Id. at 1178, 376 N.E.2d at 550 quoting "Automatic" Sprinkler Corp. of 
America v. Seneca Foods Corp., 361 Mass. 441, 443, 280 N.E.2d 423, 424 (1972). 
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limits the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant had certain 
minimum contacts with the forum state 11 and had purposefully availed 
itself of the privilege of conducting business within the forum state.10 
The Court first addressed the issue of whether the defendant had 
transacted any business within the commonwealth. It found from the 
record that the defendant corporation did not maintain an office in 
Massachusetts, that none of its officers or agents had previously done 
business in Massachusetts, and that it did not appear that the defendant 
had entered into any contracts within the commonwealth other than 
that which was the subject of this action. 11 From these facts the Court 
ruled that there were insufficient contacts for the assertion of jurisdic-
tion under chapter 223A, section 3( a): the sale was "an isolated trans-
action, with slight effect on the commerce of the Commonwealth ... " 12 
and was not the result of the defendant's purposefully availing itself of 
the privilege of conducting activities within MassachusettsP The 
Court reviewed pertinent decisions of other jurisdictions,14 but con-
cluded that the c1uestion of what activities constitute the transaction of 
business in any given case must be decided on the particular facts 
involved. 1" In the instant case, in view of the nature of the defendant's 
activities and the alleged legal injury which was claimed to have arisen 
from them, the Court concluded that the defendant had not transacted 
any business in the commonwealth within the meaning of chapter 223A, 
section 3( a) .16 
The Court next addressed the question under section 3(b) of whether 
the defendant had contracted to supply services or things in the com-
monwealth. It determined that the essential consideration here was 
the practical question of where the services or things were to be sup-
!) See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 ( 1945). See 
also Saporita v. Litner, 371 Mass. 607, 358 N.E.2d 809 (1976); Ross v. Ross, 371 
Mass. 439, 358 N.E.2d 437 ( 1976); and "Automatic" Sprinkler Corp. of America 
v. Seneca Foods Corp., 361 Mass. 441, 444, 280 N.E.2d 423, 425 (1972). 
10 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 ( 1958). 
11 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1180, 376 N.E.2d at 551. 
12 Id. at 1181, 376 N.E.2d at 551. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 1181-84, 376 N.E.2d at 551-52 citing Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta 
Co., 344 F.2d 583 (2d Gir. 1965); Quartet Mfg. Co. v. Allied Traders, Ltd., 343 
F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Geneva Industries, Inc. v. Copeland Constr. Co., 
312 F. Supp. 186 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Morgan v. Heckle, 171 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. 
Ill. 1959); Tabor & Co. v. McNall, 30 Ill. App. 3d 593, 333 N.E.2d 562 ( 1975); 
Willis v. West Ky. Feeder Pig Co., 132 Ill. App. 2d 266, 265 N.E.2d 899 ( 1971 ); 
A. Millner Co. v. Noudar, LDA, 24 A.D.2d 326, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289 (N.Y. 1966); 
and Jump v. Duplex Vending Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 950, 246 N.Y.S.2d 864 (N.Y. 
1964). 
15 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1184, 376 N.E.2d at 552-53. 
IG Id. at 1184-85, 376 N.E.2d at 553. 
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plied, rather than the more academic problem of loca ing the "place of 
contracting." 17 The c~ntract did not specify which party was to bear 
the responsibility of delivering the engines in Massachusetts. Instead, 
the bill of lading merely stated that the shipping ch1rges were to be 
paid by the plaintiff "collect." Is The Court there£ re assumed that 
the contract was intended to be a shipping contract; i .. , that the seller's 
only obligation was to make transportation arrangements with an in-
dependent carrier and to deliver the goods to the carrier.19 Accordingly, 
the Court held that the defendant's responsibility fol delivery of the 
engines was concluded when it delivered the good to a carrier in 
Florida. Therefore, the defendant had not contracted o supply "things" 
in Massachusetts/0 and the Court did not have jurisdiction over the 
defendant under section 3(b) of chapter 223A. 
In order to limit what might otherwise have been rery troublesome 
dicta, ~he Court concluded by stating that, even if it had found that 
the defendant bad contracted to supply two marine engines in Massa-
chusetts, this isolated act, without other significant contacts, would not 
meet the requisite constitutional standards for the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction in Massachusetts.21 I 
§3.2. Personal Jurisdiction: Relief from Default Judbnent: Necessity 
of Counteraffidavits. A plaintiff seeking to obtain personal jurisdiction 
over an out-of-state defendant should resort to the Long Arm Statute 1 
rather than rely on "last and usual" service 2 which ~e has reason to 
believe may be defective. Conversely, an out-of-stat defendant who 
has a default judgment entered against him as a result of improper "last 
and usual" service may find relief under Mass. R. Civ. P. 60( b). In 
Farley v. Sprague,3 the Supreme Judicial Court sanctioned a motion for 
relief from judgment as a means to set aside a default judgment based 
on improper service. The Court also re-emphasized t e importance of 
filing counteraffidavits in relation to motions to dism'ss,4 for summary 
17 Id. at 1185, 376 N.E.2d at 553. 
18 Id. at 1186-87, 376 N.E.2d at 553. 
l!l Id. at 1187, 376 N.E.2d at 553. See 1A U/\IFORM LAfs ANNOT., U.C.C., 
comment 5 to § 2-503 (1976); and J. WHITE & R. SuMMERS, UNIFORM CoMMER-
CIAL GonE § 5-2, at 142-43 ( 1972). 
20 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1187, 376 N.E.2d at 553-54. 
21 Id. at 1188, 376 N.E.2d at 554. 
§3.2. 1 G.L. c. 223A. 
2 Mass. R. Civ. P. 4 ( d) ( 1 ) provides that service of proces] upon an individual 
may he made " ... by delivering a copy of the summons a d of the complaint 
to him personally; or by leaving copies thereof at his last md usual place of 
abode .... " Thus "last and usual" service remains available notwithstanding 
the revision of former G.L. c. 223, § 31. 
a 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 385, 372 N.E.2d 1298. 
-1 Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b). 
3
Wodlinger and Kaplan: Chapter 3: Civil Practice and Procedure
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1978
§3.2 CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 67 
judgment" and for relief from judgment.6 Absent counteraffidavits, "the 
allegations in the uncontroverted affidavits of the moving party" 7 are 
likely to be taken as "true for the purposes of the particular motion." 8 
The plaintiff sued to recover for work and materials allegedly sup-
plied pursuant to a building contract for the defendant's premises.O The 
summons and complaint were served at the "last and usual place of 
abode" in Boston but were returned to plaintiff's attorney by the de-
fendant's financial advisor, together with a letter stating that defendant 
was a legal resident of Florida. 10 The plaintiff filed two "military affi-
davits" 11 which stated that the defendant was not in the military, but 
resided at 442 Seaspray A venue, Palm Beach, Florida. A default judg-
ment and execution were then issued.12 
The defendant's first k11owledge of the judgment came when the 
plaintiff mailed notice of the same to the defendant at his Florida ad-
dress.H The defendant filed a motion under Mass. R. Civ. P. 60(b )( 4) 
and ( 6) for relief from judgment, supported by two affidavits. The 
motion was grounded on lack of proper service and lack of jurisdiction 14 
and was supported by affidavits stating that the defendant had not 
resided in Massachusetts since 1933.15 
The superior court denied the motion and was affirmed by the Appeals 
CourtY' The Appeals Court noted that the judge below did not state 
his reasons for denying the motion for relief from judgment and ruled 
that since the judge could have disbelieved the defendant's affidavits, his 
decision could not be held to he in error.H The Supreme Judicial Court 
acknowledged that this accorded with governing precedent prior to the 
enactment of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure,18 hut held 
that on the basis of federal precedents 19 and the Massachusetts cases 
o Mass. R. Civ. P. 56. 
G Mass. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
7 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 390, 372 N.E.2d at 1301. 
s Id. 
n Id. at 385-86, 372 N.E.2d at 1299. 
10 Id. at 386, 372 N.E.2d at 1299. 
11 See Mass. R. Civ. P. 55( b) ( 4). 
12 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 386-87, 372 N.E.2d at 1299. 
13 Id. at 387, 372 N.E.2d at 1299. 
H The defendant entered a special appearance only to file the motion. Id. 
u; 1978 Mass. Adv .. Sh. at 387, 372 N.E.2d at 1300. 
1G 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 348, 360 N.E.2d 1073. 
17 Id. at 349, 360 N.E.2d at 1074. 
18 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 389, 372 N.E.2d at 1300. Sec Macera v. Mancini, 
327 Mass. 616, 621, 99 N.E.2d 869, 872 ( 1951) and Deluca v. Boston Elev. Ry., 
312 Mass. 495, 500, 45 N .E.2d 463, 466 (1942). 
19 The court noted that in two recent decisions it was held "[t]he adjudged 
construction theretofore given to those Federal rules is to be given to our rules, 
absent compelling reasons to the contrary." 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 390, 372 
4
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I 
which have interpreted and applied the Massachusetts Rules of Civil 
Procedure in accord with federal precedent,20 the juldge was required 
to accept the uncontroverted affidavits of the defendapt in deciding the 
motion for relief from judgment.21 Speaking of the analogous case of 
summary judgment,22 the Court clearly stressed, 
... the importance, and in some cases the necessity, for opposing 
affidavits. The party failing to file an opposing affidavit in such 
a situation cannot rely on the hope that the judge ray draw "con-
tradictory inferences" in his favor from the appar9ntly undisputed 
facts alleged in the affidavit of the moving party.23 
The Court concluded its opinion with the observf.tion that the de-
fendant's motion sought only vacation and setting aslide of the default 
judgment entered against him, and not that the action be dismissed.24 
The Court mentioned, without passing on the question, that the plain-
tiff's conduct might have "demonstrated something sllort of good faith" 
in carrying his action to the default judgment stage ~hen he had rea-
sonable cause to know that the defendant did not reside in Massa-
chusetts.25 I 
§3.3. Jurisdiction and Venue Under Chapter 180A. The first reported 
Massachusetts case decided under the Uniform Management of Insti-
tutional Funds Act 1 resolved pertinent questions of urisdiction, venue, 
N.E.2d at 1301, citing Rollins Environment Services, Inc. v. Superior Court, 368 
Mass. 174, 179-80, 330 N.E.2d 814, 818 (1975) and Niclfols Ass'n v. Starr, 4 
Mass. App. 91, 93, 341 N.E.2d 909, 910 ( 1976). See 1978 ~ ass. Adv. Sh. at 390-
91, 372 N.E.2d at 1301 for fedeml cases cited. 
20 Nichols, n.19 supra at 93-94, 341 N.E.2d at 910-11 (uncontroverted motion 
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12( b) ( 6) granted and upheld); Olde 
Towne Liquor Store v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm'n,t372 Mass. 152, 155, 
360 N.E.2d 1057, 1060 ( 1977) (uncontroverted motion fo summary judgment 
under Rule 56); Community Nat'! Bank v. Dawes, 369 M, ss. 550, 558-59, 340 
N.E.2d 877, 882 (1976) (party failing to file counteraffidavit not entitled to bene-
fit of contradictory inferences drawn from apparently undisnluted facts in moving 
party's affidavit). 
21 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 391-92, 372 N.E.2d at 1302. 
22 Mass. R. Civ. P. 56( e) expressly requires counteraffidavits to show a genuine 
issue of material fact on some equivalent showing in sworn discovery. 
23 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 391, 372 N.E.2d at 1301-02 c~· ing Community Nat'l 
Bank, n.20 supra and Nichols, n.19 supra at 94-97, 341 N .. 2d at 911-13. This 
rule does not, however, apply in criminal east's. See, e.g., C mmonwealth v. Bart-
lett, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 829, 834 n.6, 374 N.E.2d 1203, 1205-06 n.6 where 
uncontroverted allegations of improper service in the def~dant's affidavit were 
held to be still subject to discretionary J'udicial disbelief, alt ough in that instance 
the sentence was vacated and the defau t removed because t e record affirmatively 
showed an erroneous notice of a pretrial conference. 
24 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 392, 372 N.E.2d at 1302. 
~u I 
§3.3. 1 G.L. c. 180A, §§ 1-11 (added by Acts of 1975, c. 886). 
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and notice. In Williams College v. Attorney General,2 the College 
sought the release of several donors' separate investment restrictions 
which prevented the college from adding these funds to its consolidated 
endowment funds. 3 The Berkshire probate court, where the petition 
was filed, doubted it had jurisdiction to decide the matter,4 and so it 
reserved and reported the case to the Appeals Court pursuant to chapter 
215, section 13.5 
The donors of the gifts at issue were all deceased. Unable therefore 
to obtain the donors' consent to release of investment restrictions, Wil-
liams College sought relief under section 9 of chapter 180A. That sec-
tion permits an institution to apply to a "court of competent jurisdiction' 
for release of an investment restriction on a gift when the donors' con-
sent cannot be obtained because of death or unavailability, inter alia.6 
One question reported to the Court was whether the probate court is a 
"court of competent jurisdiction" to order a release of a restriction on 
use or investment.7 The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the nature 
of the relief sought under the statute is equitable, and therefore is 
within the probate court's equitable jurisdiction as granted by chapter 
215, section 6.8 
2 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1265, 375 N.E.2d 1225. 
3 Id. at 1266, 375 N.E.2d at 1227. The common investment policies applicable 
to the consolidated endowment fund did not extinguish the separate character of 
the constituent, smaller funds; each was assigned a discrete share in the consolidated 
fund. 
4 The probate court seems to have raised the jurisdictional issue sua sponte. 
It does not appear to have been urged hy the Attorney General. 1978 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 1266, 375 N.E.2d at 1227. 
5 Although the probate judge reserved and reported the case without formally 
entering a final judgment or interlocutory order, the Supreme Judicial Court found 
an interlocutory order implied in the probate court's report of the matter. 1978 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1266-67 n.2, 375 N.E.2d at 1227 n.2. 
6 Section 9 reads in part: 
With the written consent of the donor, the governing board [i.e., the body 
responsible for the management of an institution or institutional fund] may 
release, in whole or in part, a restriction imposed by the applicable gift in-
stnunent on the use or investment of an institutional fund. 
If written consent of the donor cannot be obtained by reason of his death, 
disability, unavailability, or impossibility of identification, the governing board 
may apply in the name of the institution to a court of competent jurisdiction 
for release of a restriction imposed by the applicable gift instrument on the 
use or investment of an institutional fund. The Attorney General shall be 
notified of the application and shall be given an opportunity to be heard. 
If the court finds that the restriction is obsolete, inappropriate, or imprac-
ticable, it may by order release the restriction in whole or in part. A release 
under this subsection may not change an endowment fund to a fund that is 
not an endowment fund. 
This section does not limit the application of the doctrine of cy pres. 
7 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1267, 375 N.E.2d at 1227. 
8 Id. at 1268, 375 N.E.2d at 1228. G.L. c. 215, § 6 confers on probate courts 
"original and concurrent jurisdiction with the supreme judicial and · superior courts 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1978 [1978], Art. 6
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1978/iss1/6
70 1978 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETfS ~AW §3.3 
Three other questions reported by the probate court concerned proper 
venue for an action brought under section 9. One 1sked whether the 
Probate Court of Berkshire County i~ a proper foru91 to decide ques-
tions arising from inter vivos gift instruments made outside the com-
monwealth and outside the county.11 One 0f the gifts was made through 
a trust instrument made in New York. The Court h~ld that the action 
was transitory and therefore venue would lie in th~ county where a 
party resides or has its usual place of business. Since vVilliams College 
has it~ place of business in Berkshire County, venue in I this probate comt 
was proper with respect to the inter vivos trust creat~d in New York.10 
The Court applied this reasoning to a testamentary disposition from an 
estate probated outside of Berkshire County but within Massachusetts, 
but since no out-of-state estate was involved in the !action, the Court 
declined to provide an answer for such a situation.11 
Another venue <!ucstion asked if the Probate Court for Berkshire 
County is the appropriate forum for a chapter 180Al section 9, action 
where the donors and the trust "are strangers to the ptobate court in the 
sense that the trust institution, in its formation and operation, and the 
gifts to it, were all without the judicial aegis of the I Berkshire Probate 
Court."1 ~ Again the Supreme Judicial Court had n~ difficulty finding 
venue appropriate in this case. The Comt noted that no other probate 
court had taken jurisdiction of any case involving thf inter vivos gifts; 
had such a situation arisen, then jurisdiction over th~ trust would have 
to remain with the probate comt with original jurisdiction.l3 The Court 
also noted that the testamentary gifts arose from wiljs which had been 
probated in the Probate Court for Suffolk County.l4 Under chapter 
215, section 7 that court had exclusive jurisdiction over the probate of 
these wills and administration of the estates. The Court decided that 
section 7 did not obtain here because "[t]he earlier Pfobate proceedings 
ended with the final distribution of the property to the college."15 In 
reaching this conclusion the Court stressed that the release of invest-
ment and use restrictions is a distinct question from the probate of the 
donors' wills. 16 I 
of all vases am] matters of equity cognizable uncler the genenll principles of ec1uity 
jurisprudcnve, and with reference thereto, shall he courts of general equity juris-
didion ... " except regarding labor injunctions. 
n 1978 ~lass. Adv. Sh. at 1269, 375 N.E.2d at 1228. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 1270, 375 N.E.2d at 1228. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 1270-71, 375 N.E.2d at 1229. See also G.L. c. 215, § B. 
H 1978 !\lass. Adv. Sh. at 1271, 375 N.E.2d at 1229. 
15 Id. 
lG Id. 
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Lastly, the Court ruled that Williams need only give notice to the 
Attorney General under chapter 180, section 9, since all the original 
donors were dead.H Moreover, since Williams' action only affected the 
investment restrictions on the funds, rather than their application and 
distribution, the more extensive notice requirements mandated for cy 
pres action by chapter 214, section lOB, are unnecessary. 1 ~ 
§3.4. Venue and Chapter 93A: Venue Otherwise Proper as an Unfair 
Act or Practice. In Schubach v. Household Finance Corporation1 the 
Supreme Judicial Court determined that conduct which is specifically 
permitted by statute or common law principles may still constitute an 
unfair act or practice under chapter 93A, section 2 (a). In particular, 
the practice of filing actions in courts great distances from the homes 
of consumer defendants may constitute such an unfair practice, even 
though venue would be proper under chapter 223, section 2, of the 
General Laws.2 
In this case the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Schubach, were residents of 
Holyoke and had executed a loan contract with the defendant, House-
hold Finance Corporation ( HFC), at its Holyoke office.3 When the 
Schubachs defaulted on their loan payments HFC filed a collection 
action against them in the Boston Municipal Court.4 The complaint 
in the present action alleged that HFC chose a distant forum with the 
intent and purpose of increasing the Schubach's burden of defending 
the collection action, thereby obtaining a default judgment or, at least, 
a more favorable judgment against them. They further alleged that 
HFC regularly files collection actions at places inconvenient to de-
fendants and claimed such conduct constitutes a violation of section 2 
of chapter 93A." HFC answered by filing a motion to dismiss the action 
pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12( b) ( 6) for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. The lower court denied HFC's motion 
and reported its interlocutory order to the Appeals Court. The Supreme 
Judicial Court granted HFC's application for direct appellate review.6 
The only issue before the Supreme Judicial Court was whether a 
practice which is permitted under state law 7 could nevertheless be 
17 Id. at 1272, 375 N.E.2d at 1229. See al.so note 6 supra. 
18 Jd. n.6, 375 N.E.2d at 1229 n.6. 
§3.4. 1 197H Mass. Adv. Sh. 1153, 376 N.E.2d 140. 
2 Id. at 1159, 376 N.E.2d at 142. 
3 Id. at 1154, 376 N.E.2d at 141. 
4 Id. 
II I d. at 1154-55, 376 N .E.2d at 141. 
6 Id. at 1154, 376 N.E.2d at 140. 
' G.L. c. 223, § 2, the venue statute for district court actions, allows actions 
to be brought in the county where one of the parties Uves or has a place of 
business. 
8
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unfair under chapter 93A. Relying upon decisions interpreting the 
Federal Trade Commission Act,8 the Court ruled that the fact that 
venue might be proper in a distant and inconvenient forum does not 
mean that filing an action in such a forum can nev~r be an unfair or 
deceptive act or practice.9 I 
§3.5. Declaratory Judgments. During the Survey~ year the Supreme 
Judicial Court twice dealt with the question of whe her an action was 
appropriate for declaratory relief pursuant to chapter 231A. The first 
of these cases was Massachusetts Association of Independent Insurance 
Agents and Brokers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Insurance. 1 In Insumnce 
Agents and Brokers the Court was called upon to determine whether an 
"actual controversy" existed within the meaning of chapter 231A, sec-
tion 1 and, if it did, whether the plaintiff had the r1quisite standing to 
assert the claim. 2 
The Association had filed this action to challengt the validity of a 
regulation issued by the Commissioner of Insura ce purporting to 
implement the provisions of chapter 175, section 1 3R.3 Thus, since 
the case involved a dispute over an official interpretation of a statute, 
and the validity of a regulation promulgated under that statute, the 
Court dete1mined that a justiciable dispute existed.4 It noted, how-
ever, that "controversy in the abstract" does not entitle a plaintiff to 
8 G.L. c. 93A, § 2( b), added by Acts of 1967, c. 13, ~ 1, directs the courts 
of the Commonwealth to be uided by the interpretations given by the Federal 
Trade Commission and the fecferal courts to section 6( a) ( 1) of the Federal TradP 
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45( a) ( 1) ( 1976). The Court in Schubach relied 
substantially on Spiegel, Inc. , .. Federal Trade Comm'n, 54 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 
1976) in which the Seventh Circuit upheld an FTC order njoining Spiegel from 
its practice of suing defaulting out-of-state debtors in Cook County, Illinois. The 
Spiegel court noted that in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 
405 U.S. 233 (1972) "the Supreme Court left no doubt that the FTC had the 
authority to prohibit conduct that, although legally proper, was unfair to the 
public." 540 F.2d at 292. See also Aguchak v. 1\fontgomcry Ward Co., 520 P.2d 
1352 (Alas. 1974); Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n of Oakland, Inc., 7 Cal.3d 
94, 496 P.2d 817 (1972); and Vargas v. Allied Fin. Co., 45 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1976). 
9 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1159, 376 N.E.2d at 142. 
§3.5. 1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1871, 367 N.E.2d 796. T e plaintiff is a trade 
association incorporated under G.L. c. 180 with a membe ship of approximately 
3500 licensed brokers and agents. 
2 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1873-74, 367 N.E.2d at 799. 
3 Rules and Regulations Regarding Insurance Issued Pursuant to a Group 
Marketing Plan, Division of Insurance, Reg. 3-7 4. This regulation proposed to 
govern group marketing hut not mass merchandising plans for selling insurance 
to the public. This would enable insurance companies to PI'ovide to the public 
through mass merchandising plans while bypassing agents and brokers. 
4 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1874-75, 367 N.E.2d at 799. 
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declaratory relief; the plaintiff must also be able to demonstrate a 
"legally cognizable injury."5 
In the instant case, the immediate cause of any alleged injury would 
be business competition.6 While such an injury alone is usually not 
sufficient to confer standing, this is not true where competitors in a 
regulated industry are challenging a regulation affecting their com-
petitive position.7 However, even in these relaxed circumstances, it is 
still necessary to determine, as a precondition to declaratory relief, both 
that the alleged injury is within the parameters of the statutory concern 
and that it is the type of injury that is inconsistent with the whole 
regulatory scheme.~ In this case, it is clear that the insurance business 
is a highly regulated industry. Additionally, the Court found that the 
regulation in question could affect the stated legislative policy of main-
taining a reasonable level of competition in the insurance industry.9 
The Court then addressed the question of the Association's standing. 
This issue really devolved into two separate components: ( 1) whether 
insurance brokers and agents were the appropriate parties to seek 
relief, and ( 2) if so, whether the plaintiff corporation could bring the 
suit on their behalf. As to the first, the Court found that the regulation 
in question could affect the ability of insurance brokers and, to a lesser 
degree, agents to obtain adequate and reasonably priced coverage for 
the public, as well as their ability to compete in the market place.10 
The second issue involved a determination of whether the plaintiff 
corporation was the "real party in interest" within the meaning of Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 17 (a). The Court noted that the "real party in interest" re-
quirement was designed to protect a defendant against· a multiplicity 
of suits by similarly situated plaintiffs.11 In the present case the actions 
of the plaintiff corporation reflected the interests of at least a majority 
of its individual members-insurance agents and brokers. Thus, allow-
ing the corporation to sue would serve the ends of judicial economy 
by avoiding a multiplicity of suits. Indeed, the Court stated, failure 
to recognize the Association as the real party in interest would probably 
"disserve the explicit purpose of Rule 17 (a) ."12 
5 ld. at 1875, 367 N.E.2d at 799. 
G See note 3 supra. 
7 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1875, 367 N.E.2d at 800. 
s Id. at 1876, 367 N.E.2d at 800. 
» Id. at 1877-78, 367 N.E.2d at 800-1 citi11g G.L. c. 174A, § 2; G.L. c. 175, 
§ 113B; G.L. c. 175A, §§ 2, 4. 
10 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1878-79, 367 N.E.2d at 801. 
11 Id. at 1880, 367 N.E.2d at 801, citi11g J.W. SMITH & H.B. ZollEL, RULES 
PRACTICE § 17.2 (1975). 
12 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1881, 367 N.E.2d at 802. 
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The second case involving a request for declarairy relief decided 
during the Survey year focused on the power of a co tt to issue declar-
atory relief in a case which was really not adversa ial in nature. In 
Babson v. Babson 13 the factual question to be determined was whether 
it was the testator's intention, as shown by his will, to obtain the benefit 
of the maximum federal estate tax marita.l deductiont14 The action was 
brought under chapter 231A, section 2 which specific lly authorizes the 
use of the declaratory provisions contained in sectio 1 of that Act "to 
secure determinations of right, duty, status or other legal relations 
under ... wills .... " The Coutt noted that section 2 was intended to 
expand, at the discretion of the Coutt, prior provisi9ns with regard to 
the interpretation of written instruments.H' I 
In the Babson case the plaintiffs. were the execuJors of the will of 
Paul T. Babson. The defendants were the legatees and beneficiaries 
under the will, the trustees of trusts established' under the will, the 
Attorney General of the Commonwealth, and the CJmmissioner of the 
Internal Revenue Service. Each of the defendant was served with 
process and given notice of the hearing before th Supreme Judicial 
Court, but none chose to appear.16 The Court determined that the fact 
that the defendants had chosen not to participate did not preclude 
review under section 1 of chapter 231A.17 . ~ 
The Court noted that under existing decisions a c ntroversy can exist 
even though no direct, immediate interest of a pres nt life beneficiary 
would be affected 18 and even though all parties urge the same result.19 
In this case the controversy concerning the testator's "intent" had im-
mediate bearing upon the actions of the executors; }n patticular, what 
they should do "now" with respect to federal esttte taxes. All the 
interested parties had been given notice and their failure to appear 
did not alter the adversary nature of the proceeding in that the execu-
tors were, nevertheless, seeking a judicial determination of their rights.20 
Finally, the Coutt's decision would be dispositive of the state law issue 
13 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2759, .371 N.E.2d 430. . 
H Id. at 2765, 371 N.E.2d at 433-34. The Court made clear that it was not 
deciding a question concerning the availability of the marital deduction, since 
that is a matter of federal tax law. However, the Court saw no reason why it 
could not determine the testator's intention with reference tl that deduction. Id. 
15 Id. at 2766, 371 N.E.2d at 434. 
1o Id., 371 N.E.2d at 435. 
17 Id. 
l8 Id., .371 N.E.2d at 434 citing Billings v. Fowler, 361 Mass. 230, 233-34, 279 
N.E.2d 906, 909 (1972). 
In 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2766-67, .371 N.E.2d at 434 citing Persky v. Hutner, 
369 Mass. 7, 8, 336 N.E.2d 865, 866 ( 1975) and Putnam t· Putnam, 366 Mass. 
261, 265-66, 316 N.E.2d 729, 734 (1974). 
20 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2768 n.5, 371 N.E.2d at 435 .5. 
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presented for the Court's own subsequent decisions, as well as further 
federal tax litigation.21 
§3.6. Medicaid Malpractice Actions. Following its decision in 
Austin v. Boston University Hospital 1 that only those medical mal-
practice actions filed after January 1, 1976, would he referred to the 
statutory tribunals,2 the Supreme Judicial Court was faced with ques-
tions concerning the limitations period for such actions 3 and the 
constitutionality of the statute itsel£.4 
In contrast to Austin, where the newly created liability of unsuccess-
ful plaintiffs for legal costs and expenses " was seen to work a sub-
stantive change in the law, the Court in Cioffi v. Guenther 0 saw the 
statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions 7 as affecting only 
a change in the remedy. Thus, although the new tribunal system is 
only to be applied prospectively, the new statute of limitations may 
bar causes of action accming before January 1, 1976. Section 60D of 
chapter 231 negates the limitations period prescribed by section 7 of 
chapter 260 in relation to medical malpractice plaintiffs who are minors. 
Prior to the enactment of section 60D, such plaintiffs could await their 
majority before the limitations period would begin to nm against 
them. Under section 60D, however, minor plaintiffs in medical mal-
practice actions must file a complaint within three years after the cause 
of action accmes. 8 · 
In Cioffi, the plaintiff was injured in 1971, then being nine years old.9 
His action was brought on December 28, 1976. Section 60D, which was 
enacted on June 19, 197510 went into effect on January 1, 1976,11 The 
Supreme Judicial Court mled that the action, though accming before 
21 Id. at 2768, 372 N.E.2d at 435. 
§3.6. 1 372 Mass. 654, 363 N.E.2d 515 (1977). 
2 Id. at 658, 363 N.E.2d at 518. G.L. c. 231, §§ 60B-E regulate the bringing 
of malpractice actions against health care providers. Section 60B requires that 
such actions shall first be heard by a tribunal to be composed of three members: 
a judge . of the superior court, a physician licensed to practice medicine in the 
commonwealth, and an attorney licensed to practice law in the commonwealth. 
Under certain circumstances the physician's place may be taken by sone other 
representative from the field of medicine. For a critical review of the malpractice 
statute see Smith, Torts, 1975 ANN. SuRV. MAss. LAw § 1.8. 
3 Cioffi v. Guenther, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2631, 370 N.E.2d 1003. 
4 Paro v. Longwood Hospital, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2353, 369 N.E.2d 985. 
r. G.L. c. 231, § 60B. See note 16 infra. 
o 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2631, 370 N.E.2d 1003. 
7 G.L. c. 231, § 60D. 
R Id. This section, however, allows a minor who is under six years of age to 
commence his action up until his ninth birthday. 
9 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2632, 370 N.E.2d at 1004. 
1o Acts of 1975, c. 362, § 5. 
11 Id. § 13. 
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the enactment and effective date of section 60D, was governed by 
section 60D's limitation period.12 The Court therefore directed that 
the defendant's motion for summary judgment be allowed.13 The Court 
noted that statutes of limitation "relate only to the re!edy"14 and may 
be applied to causes of action preceding statutor. changes. The 
relevant standard used by the Court was whether ufficient time is 
allowed between the statute's enactment and its effec ive date to give 
persons with such causes of action "a full and ample ti e" to commence 
their actions.15 The Court went on to find that the six-month post-
ponement of the statute's effective date was reasonable and was not a 
denial of justice as applied to a thirteen-year-old minor.16 
In Paro v. Longwood HospitalP the Court rejected a constirutional 
challenge to section 60B of chapter 231 that was premised on equal 
protection, due process, and separation of powers lounds. In that 
case the special tribunal, after a hearing, found for th defendants and 
required the plaintiffs to post a $2,000 bond 1s before roceeding in the 
superior court with their action.19 Plaintiffs' motion for reduction of 
the bond amount for hardship 20 was denied. The acti n was dismissed 
when the plaintiffs failed to file the bond within the thirty days pro-
vided by section 60B. 21 
The Court first determined that no fundamental right was at issue 
and that the plaintiffs would have to demonstrate that the legislative 
classifications-medical malpractice plaintiffs versus a I other plaintiffs 
and plaintiffs versus defendants-were without a rati nal basis.22 The 
12 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2635, 370 N.E.2d at 1006. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 2633, 370 N.E.2d at 1005 citing Mulvey v. Boston, 97 ~lass. 178, 181, 
83 N.E. 402, 403 (1908). 
15 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2633, 370 N.E.2d at 1005 citi11g Loring v. Alline, 63 
Mass. (9 Cush.) 68, 71 (1851). 
16 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2634, 370 N.E.2d at 1005. 
17 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2353, 369 N.E.2d 985. 
18 G.L. c. 231, § 60B states in part: 
If a finding is made for the defendant the plaintiff may pursue the. claim 
through the usual judicial process only upon filing bond i the amount of 
two thousand dollars secured by cash or its equivalent wit the clerk of the 
court in which the case is pending, payable to the defendant for costs assessed, 
including witness and experts fees and attorneys fees if the plaintiff does not 
prevail in the final judgment. Said single justice may, wit ·n his discretion, 
increase the amount of the bond required to be filed. If said bond is not 
posted within thi.ty days of the tribunal's finding the action haH be dismissed. 
Upon motion filed by the plaintiff, and a determination by the court that the 
plaintiff is indigent said justice may reduce the amount of the bond but may 
not eliminate the requirement thereof. 
19 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2355, 369 N.E.2d at 987. 
20 See note 16 supra. 
21 Id. 
22 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2356-58, 369 N.E.2d at 987-89. 
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Court found this burden unmet; the legislature could have concluded 
that the tribunal and bond requirements would discourage frivolous 
malpractice claims, and it could have concluded that plaintiffs are more 
likely than defendants to press frivolous malpractice litigation.23 More-
over, equal protection does not require the legislature to address the 
problem all at once. Thus, legislation could be properly aimed at de-
terring nonmeritorious suits by plaintiffs without also restraining non-
meritorious defenses by defendants.24 
The due process claim was likewise rejected by the Court. Plaintiffs 
contended that the statute denied due process to plaintiffs who lose 
before the tribunal but still wish to try their cases in superior court.25 
They rested this claim on the argument that the bond requirement 
forces these plaintiffs to purchase justice contrary to article 11 of the 
Declaration of Rights 20 and denies them the right to a jury trial, con-
trary to article 15 of the Declaration of Rights.27 The Court rejected 
the argument that the bond denies access to the courts, noting that the 
statute gives the judge discretion in setting the amount of the bond, 
including a provision for lowering the bond below $2,000 for indigent 
plaintiffs.28 Similarly, the Court ruled that the tribunal procedure and 
bond requirement for unsuccessful plaintiffs does not substantively 
alter the right to a jury trial.29 
Lastly, the Comt rejected the claim that section 60B violates the 
separation of powers 30 by interposing a legislative body between plain-
tiffs and the courts. The medical malpractice tribunals were clearly 
judicial rather than legislative entities 31 and in any event are not ob-
structions in a plaintiff's path to the courts; the bond merely provides 
compensation for the costs of defending nonmeritorious suits.32 The 
Court stressed that the statute specifies that the judge, rather than the 
tribunal, shall set the amount of the bond nonmeritorious plaintiffs 
must pay before proceeding.33 
23 Id. at 2359-60, 369 N.E.2d at 989. 
24 Id. at 2360, 369 N.E.2d at 989. 
25 Id. Plaintiffs also attacked the lack of means to challenge the tribunal's 
members for partiality and the limited time for discovery prior to a hearing before 
the tribunal. (The tribunal is to convene fifteen days after the defendant's answer 
is filed. G.L. c. 231, § 60B.) Because these points were not raised below they 
were not considered on appeal. 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2360 n.9, 369 N.E.2d 
at 989 n.9. 
26 MAss CoNST. pt. 1, art. XI. 
27 Id. art. XV. 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2360, 369 N.E.2d at 989. 
!!8 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2361-63, 369 N.E.2d at 990. See note 16 supra. 
2n 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2364, 369 N.E.2d at 991. 
30 MAss. CoNsT. pt. 1, art. XXX. 
31 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2367, 369 N.E.2d at 992. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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Another area left unresolved by Austin was settl~d this year. In 
Byrnes v. Kirby,34 Judge Freedman agreed with th Austin Court 35 
that the medical malpractice tribunal and the liabilit of unsuccessful 
plaintiffs created by chapter 231, section 60B altered substantive law;36 
Consequently, Erie 37 requires federal district courts in Massachusetts 
to refer malpractice cases to the medical malpractice I tribunals created 
by section 60B.3s Judge Freedman directed the case to be referred to 
the superior court for hearing before a tribunal, wh se findings were 
then to be transmitted to the district court.311 
The Supreme Judicial Court, through Austin and aro, has insured 
the vitality of the medical malpractice action statu e. The problem 
resolved in Cioffi has passed as of this writing. Th decision of the 
federal district court in Byrnes makes clear that fo m shopping will 
not enable medical malpractice plaintiffs to avoid sect'on 60B's tribunal 
and bond requirements. 
§3.7. Rule 54(d): Interest and Costs. Mass. R. Ci . P. 54( d) states 
in part that "costs against the Commonwealth, its offi ers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law." In Broadhurst v. 
Director of the Division of Employment Security,! the Supreme Judicial 
Court was called upon to construe this provision of Rule 54( d) 2 in 
the context of an action to recover unemployment be efits pursuant to 
chapter 151A, section 42. The district court had or ered the director 
of the Division of Employment Security to pay the p aintiff a specified 
sum in unemployment benefits "plus interest and c sts."3 The only 
issue before the Court on appeal was whether the d strict court could 
properly impose "interest and costs" upon the Comm nwealth in addi-
tion to the unemployment benefits. 
The Court first addressed the question of "costs." e plaintiff based 
its contention that the award of costs was proper on c apter 261, section 
34 453 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1978). 
35 372 Mass. at 657, 363 N.E.2d at 517. 
3G 453 F. Supp. at 1019. 
37 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 ( 1938). 
as While Austin formally left this question unresolved as a atter of federal law, 
372 Mass. at 659, .363 N.E.2d at 518, the Court did outline a referral procedure 
in case the federal courts found referral necessary. Id. at 660 363 N.E.2d at 519. 
3!1 453 F.Supp. at 1020. 
§3.7. t 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2448, 369 N.E.2d 1018. 
2 The Order under review in this appeal was issued by a udge of the District 
Court of Hampshire and, therefore, the District/Municipal C urts Rules of Civil 
Procedure governed the court below. However, the provisions of Rule 54( d) 
being construed in this case are identical in the District/ unicipal Court and 
Superior Court Rules. 
3 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2448-49, 369 N.E.2d at 1019. 
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1, of the General La\vs. 1 That law provides: "In civil actions the 
prevailing party shall recover his costs, except as otherwise provided." 
The defendant in turn relied on Rule 54 (d)." The Court concurred 
with the defendant's argument that Rule 54( d) removes this case from 
the broad language of chapter 261, section 1, and, consequently an 
award of costs against the commonwealth could only be based upon 
"specific affirmative authority."6 
The Court then rejected the plaintiff's assertion that section 14 of 
chapter 261 provided such specific authority for the imposition of costs 
in that that statute only applies where an action has been instituted by 
the commonwealth and not when the commonwealth is the defendant.7 
The Court was also unconvinced by the plaintiff's reliance on chapter 
261, section 13, which gives a court discretion in imposing costs in 
proceedings in which no provision for costs is expressly made by law.8 
It concluded that Hule 54( cl), section 14, of chapter 261, and common 
law principles relating to sovereign immunity n constitute express pro-
visions of law. 111 The Court, therefore, found the district court's im-
position of costs improper. 
The Court similarly found the district court's award of "interest" 
improper. It first noted that chapter 151A which authorizes the filing 
of a petition for the recovery of unemployment benefits is silent with 
respect to the question of interest.U The plaintiff's reliance on .Wood-
u:orth v. Commontcealth 12 was inappropriate because, unlike the emi-
nent domain action in Woodworth, the statutory scheme concerning un-
employment benefits at issue in Broadhurst did not authorize interest 
and the present case raised no constitutional due process issuesP Nor 
was this a case involving contractual obligations where the common-
4 Id. at 2450, 369 N.E.2d at 1020. 
G Id. 
6 Id. at 2451, 369 N.E.2d at 1020. 
7 Id. at 2452-53, 369 N.E.2d at 1021. G.L. c. § 14 states: 
In civil actions and in proceedings which are instituted by, or in the name 
of, the commonwealth, and not at the relation, in behalf, or for the use, of 
a private person, the commonwealth shall be ·liable for costs as is an in-
dividual. 
R C.L. c. 261, § 13, as amended by Acts of 1973, c. 1114, § 343 provides in 
pertinent part: 
In civil actions or other proceedings in which no provision is expressly made 
by law, the costs shall he wholly irt the discretion of the court . . . . 
n See General Electric Co. v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 661, 644, 110 N.E.2d 
101, 102 (1953) and Glickman v. Commonwealth, 244 Mass. 148, 149-50, 138 
N.E. 252, 253 ( 1923). 
10 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2454, 369 N.E.2d at 1021. 
11 Id. at 2455, 369 N.E.2d at 1022. 
12 353 Mass. 229, 231-33, 230 N.E.2d 814, 816-17 ( 1967). 
13 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2456, 369 N.E.2d at 1022. 
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wealth's liability would be equivalent to that of a private litigant.14 
The Court found that the same principles apply to the imposition of 
interest as to the imposition of costs, and that the commonwealth has 
waived its sovereign immunity only to the extent expressly authorized 
by statute.15 -~ 
§3.8. Assembly of the Record on Appeal. In Super~ntendent of W or-
cester State Hospital v. Hagberg 1 the Supreme Juditial Court signifi-
cantly lightened an appellant's burden under Mass. R.A.P. 9(c). 2 The 
plaintiff in Hagberg appealed from a decision of the Appellate Division 
which had reversed a district court civil commitment. The appeal was 
filed in a timely fashion, but the record was not assembled and the ap-
peal was not docketed within forty days after the notice of appeaP The 
defendant based her motion to dismiss the appeal 4 on his delay. 
In seeking a dismissal of the appeal, the defendant elied on Westing-
house Electric Supply Co. v. Healy Corp.5 In that case the Appeals 
Court held that Mass. R.A.P. 9( c), when read in conjunction with 
Mass. R.A.P. 9 (a), requires the record to be assem led within forty 
days on pain of dismissal for noncompliance!' The estinghouse court 
reasoned that while Rule 9 uses the phrase "assembly of the record" 
rather than "transmission of the record,"7 Rule 9 "has invested timely 
assembly of the record with the same procedural significance in our 
practice that Federal appellate procedure gives to timely transmission."8 
The Supreme Judicial Court in Hagberg did not sh re this view that 
the concepts of "assembly" and "transmission" are the s me substantively. 
14 See C. & R. Constr. Co. v. Commonwealth, 334 Mass. 232, 233-34, 135 N.E.2d 
539, 540 (1956) discussed by the Broadhurst Court. 1977 M s. Adv. Sh. at 2456-
57, 369 N.E.2d at 1022. Broadhurst involved a statutory clai for unemployment 
benefits and must therefore be distinguished from an action brought against the 
Commonwealth under G.L. c. 258 or, as in C. & R., an action based on contractual 
obligation. 
15 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2457, 369 N.E.2d at 1023. In this case, the extent 
of "waiver" is found in G.L. c. 151A, § 42, which establishes procedures for ap-
peals of decisions of the Division's Board of Review. 
§3.8. 1 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 187, 372 N.E.2d 242. ~ 
2 Rule 9(c) reads in full: 
Appellant's Obligation. In addition to complying with the rovisions of Rule 
8 ( b), each appellant shall within 40 days after filing the notice of appeal 
take any action necessary, or reasonably requested by the c erk, to enable the 
clerk of the lower L'Ourt to assemble the record, and a sin le record shall be 
assembled. 
3 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 189-90, 372 N.E.2d at 244. The plaintiff-appellant 
claimed that the delay was caused by errors in the clerk's office. 
4 Mass. R.A.P. 10(c). 
5 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 69, 359 N.E.2d 634. 
6 Id. at 84 n.24, 359 N.E.2d at 643 n.24. 
7 See F.R.A.P. ll(a). 
8 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 84, 359 N.E.2d at 643. 
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The Court stated, "We take this occasion to point out the difference 
between the Federal rule and our rule: our rule does not require the 
record to be assembled in forty days. Hence no violation of our rule 
is shown in the present case."0 Thus, contrary to the Appeals Court's 
Westinghouse ruling, there is no fixed deadline for assembling the record. 
The standard is merely "as soon as may be after the filing of the notice 
of appeal."10 The Hagberg reading of the appellant's obligation is 
sound in light of Rule 9( c)'s language that the appellant is to "take any 
action necessary, or reasonably requested by the clerk [within forty 
days after filing his appeal] to enable the clerk of the lower court to 
assemble the record."11 
The rule in Hagberg was subsequently applied in Maurice Callahan 
& Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising BoardP Callahan's appeal did not 
require a transcript nor did the clerk request Callahan to take any action 
to enable the clerk to assemble the record.13 The lower court dismissed 
the appeal in reliance on Westinghouse, 14 and was then reversed by the 
Supreme Judicial Court, which again adverted to the difference from 
the federal rule. The Court explained, "Our rule requires an appellant 
to initiate timely assembly of the record, whereas the corresponding 
Federal rule requires the appellant to cause the record to be assembled 
in forty days. . . . The delay in this case was in no way attributable 
to the appellant. . . ." 15 
Thus an appellant who has ordered and secured delivery of the 
transcript and done whatever else the clerk may reasonably have re-
quested to enable the clerk to assemble the record within forty days 
after the notice of appeal was filed is now in a safe harbor even if the 
clerk may not complete assembly of the record within that period. 
o 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 190, 372 N.E.2d at 244. 
10 Mass. R.A.P. 9(a). 
11 See note 2 supra. 
12 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2239, 379 N.E.2d at 1094. 
13 Id. at 2440-41, 379 N.E.2d at 1095. 
H See text at notes 5-8 supra. 
15 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2441, 379 N.E.2d at 1095. 
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